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Abstract This paper presents two experimental findings pertaining to the semantics
and pragmatics of superlative modifiers (at least, at most). First, in a scenario with
N objects of a given type, speakers consistently judge it true that there are ‘at least
N’ and ‘at most N’ objects of that type. This supports the debated position that the
ignorance conveyed by superlative modifiers is an implicature, not an entailment, and
contrasts with results obtained using an inference-judgment paradigm, suggesting
that truth-value judgment tasks are impervious to certain pragmatic infelicities that
inference-judgment tasks are sensitive to. The second finding is not predicted by any
previous theory: In a scenario with N objects, it is not consistently judged true that
there are ‘at most N +1’ objects, even though it is consistently judged true that there
are ‘at least N−1’ objects. To explain this, we propose a novel pragmatic principle
requiring that the scenario depicted by a sentence must be considered possible by
the speaker (the Maxim of Depictive Sincerity). Put together, the two findings show
that truth-value judgment tasks are impervious to some aspects of pragmatics, but
not all.
Keywords: modified numerals; ignorance implicatures; inquisitive semantics; highlighting;
experimental methodology
1 The ignorance implication
A well-established fact about superlative modifiers is that they convey ignorance on
the part of the speaker (see, for example, Geurts & Nouwen 2007, Büring 2008 and
Nouwen 2010). This is not the case for comparatives, as illustrated by the following
contrast:
(1) a. Exactly eight students applied for the position, so that’s more than four.
b. Exactly eight students applied for the position, #so that’s at least five.
In (1a), the speaker establishes that he or she knows how many students applied for
the position, and subsequently describes the quantity as more than four. This can
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be done without raising any eyebrows. But example (1b) is infelicitous because the
ignorance implied by at least five clashes with the speaker’s knowledge as to the
number of applicants.
The existence of the ignorance implication has further been corroborated by the
experimental findings of Geurts, Katsos, Cummins, Moons & Noordman (2010). In
one of their experiments, participants were asked to judge the validity of inferences
from bare numerals (as in (2a)) to modified numerals (as in (2b)).
(2) a. Berta had N beers. [Premise]
b. Berta had

at least N
more than N−1
at most N
fewer than N +1
 beers. [Conclusion]
Their results showed a significant difference between comparatives and superlatives.
While all participants accepted the inference for more than and fewer than, only
around half accepted it for at least and at most. This contrast can be explained under
the assumption that at least and at most express ignorance, which conflicts with the
certainty expressed by the bare numeral in the premise.
Geurts et al. (2010) interpret the findings of their inference judgment task as
evidence for the view advocated by Geurts & Nouwen (2007), according to which
the ignorance implication is an entailment. Geurts & Nouwen (2007) propose
that superlative modifiers have the following modal meaning, where the ignorance
implication is expressed by the epistemic possibility operator (signified here by ‘♦’;
‘’ signifies epistemic necessity).
(3) a. Berta had at least three beers.
b. [Berta had three beers] ∧ ♦[Berta had more than three beers]
(4) a. Berta had at most three beers.
b. ♦[Berta had three beers] ∧ [Berta had no more than three beers]
We refer to this as the ‘ignorance-as-entailment view’.
A more pervasive view (Büring 2008; Cohen & Krifka 2011; Coppock &
Brochhagen 2013, i.a.) is that the ignorance inference is a conversational im-
plicature. Geurts et al.’s (2010) results are compatible with this view as well. As
Kaplan (1999) points out, validity intuitions are determined by whether the infor-
mation conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by
the premise, and truth-conditions are not the only kind of information that may
play a role in such a setting. In our case, the ignorance implicature conveyed by
the conclusion is not contained in the premise. The ignorance-as-implicature view
moreover sheds light on why 50% of the participants did judge the inference to hold
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for at least. On the ignorance-as-implicature view, the inference is logically valid,
even though the conclusion is pragmatically infelicitous when the premise is true.
Hence, Geurts et al.’s results are compatible with both views, and further data
is needed in order to tease them apart. We used a slightly different methodological
paradigm for this purpose. Rather than asking participants to judge whether A
implies B, we depicted a scenario where A is true, and asked them whether B is true
or false in that scenario. This methodology turned out, as we expected, to diagnose
entailment more precisely than the validity-judgment task: in a scenario with N
objects of a given type, we found that speakers consistently judge it true that there
are ‘at least N’ and ‘at most N’ objects of that type (and we found no contrast with
comparative modifiers). We will report on those results in detail in §3, after briefly
describing Coppock & Brochhagen’s (2013) particular ignorance-as-implicature
analysis, which uses inquisitive semantics.
However, this is not the end of the story. We found an additional result that is not
predicted by any previous theory: In a scenario with N objects, it is not consistently
judged true that there are ‘at most N + 1’ objects, even though it is consistently
judged true that there are ‘at least N− 1’ objects. To explain this, we propose a
novel pragmatic principle requiring that the scenario depicted by a sentence must be
considered possible by the speaker (the Maxim of Depictive Sincerity). We adopt
the notion of ‘highlighting’ from inquisitive semantics in order to formalize this
principle.
Methodologically, these results have two broader consequences, taken together:
In contrast to validity-judgment tasks, truth-value judgment tasks are impervious
to some pragmatic violations, but there are still some pragmatic infelicities that
truth-value judgment tasks are sensitive to.
2 Ignorance as implicature
As mentioned above, there are a number of different analyses on which the ignorance
implication is treated as an implicature. In this section, we summarize Coppock
& Brochhagen’s (2013) particular instantiation of this view, which uses inquisitive
semantics. This is the analysis we will propose to build upon later in the paper.
Coppock & Brochhagen’s analysis takes inspiration from Büring’s (2008) idea
that superlative modifiers are very much like disjunctions. In particular, just like
superlative modifiers, disjunctions can evoke ignorance implicatures, as has been
much discussed in recent literature. For example, disjunctions behave similarly to
superlative modifiers in a context like the one in (1). Consider (5).
(5) Exactly eight students applied for the position, #so that’s eight or more.
Büring (2008) proposes to treat at least α as a disjunction over alternatives ranked as
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11 10
01 00
(a) Classical
11 10
01 00
(b) Inquisitive
Figure 1 Classical and inquisitive disjunction.
high or higher than α on a pragmatically-given scale; Cummins & Katsos 2010 and
Biezma 2013 adopt this analysis as well. Rather than treating superlative modifiers
as disjunctions (which becomes problematic when one attempts to specify the level
at which this classification holds), Coppock & Brochhagen propose that superlative
modifiers and disjunctions have an important property in common, namely that they
are both typically inquisitive, in the sense of inquisitive semantics. (The reader is
referred to that paper for justification of this approach.)
In contrast to classical frameworks, where a declarative sentence denotes a set
of possible worlds and an interrogative sentence denotes a set of sets of possible
worlds, both declaratives and interrogatives denote sets of sets of possible worlds
in inquisitive semantics. If, following inquisitive semantics jargon, we use the
term possibility for a set of possible worlds, we can say that both declarative and
interrogative sentences denote sets of possibilities in inquisitive semantics. The sets
of possibilities that sentences may denote are called propositions.
To illustrate, let us consider how disjunctions are treated in both cases. In
inquisitive semantics, a disjunction denotes a set of possiblities, one per disjunct,
each containing all the worlds under which the respective disjunct is true. Under
a classical analysis, in contrast, disjunctions are treated as an undifferentiated set
of possible worlds. The contrast between classical and inquisitive disjunctions is
shown in Figure 1, where each dot represents a possible world, and the numbers on
the dots represent what is true at the world. For example, let w10 be the world where
Ann snores and Bill does not, w01 the world where Bill snores and Ann does not,
w11 the world where both snore and w00 the world where neither of them snores.
Then the disjunction being represented is Ann or Bill snores.
Coppock & Brochhagen (2013) make use of an extension of the original in-
quisitive semantics framework called unrestricted inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli,
Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009, 2012). In the original framework, propositions
361
Coppock and Brochhagen
contain all subsets of every possibility they contain, but in unrestricted inquisitive
semantics, this property is not required to hold, so nested possibilities can play an
important role. In this setting, a proposition is said to be inquisitive if it contains
more than one maximal possibility, where a maximal possibility is a possibility that
is not fully contained by any other possibility. A proposition is attentive if it contains
a non-maximal possibility (the idea being that one draws attention to each of the
possibilities in the denotation).
(6) Inquisitivity and attentiveness (Ciardelli et al. 2009)
a. ϕ is inquisitive iff JϕK contains at least two maximal possibilities;
b. ϕ is attentive iff JϕK contains a non-maximal possibility.
For the discussion of superlative modifiers, it is useful to have a term covering both:
(7) Interactivity (Coppock & Brochhagen 2013)
ϕ is interactive iff JϕK contains more than one possibility.
A proposition is interactive iff it is inquisitive or attentive.
Coppock & Brochhagen’s (2013) claim is that sentences with superlative modi-
fiers are, in general, interactive. Specifically, Coppock & Brochhagen propose that
at least α denotes the set of possibilities that are as strong or stronger than JαK,
and that at most α denotes the set of possibilities weaker than or as strong as JαK,
excluding higher ranked possibilities. The possibilities are answers to the current
question under discussion (QUD) ranked by pragmatic strength (≤). For the present
purpose, Coppock & Brochhagen’s (2013) proposed meanings of superlatives can
be simplified as follows (s stands for ‘state’ and represents the current discourse
context):
(8) Jat least αKs = {p | p≤s p′ for some p′ ∈ JαKs}
(9) Jat most αKs = {p′∩MAXs(p) | p ∈ JαKs∧ p′ ≤s p}
where MAXs(p) = λw . ∀p′ ∈ QUDs : p′(w)→ p≥ s p′
To take a simple example, consider At least Ann snores vs. Ann snores in the
context of the QUD ‘Who snores?’, depicted in Figure 2. The information provided
by the two sentences is identical, but the former is interactive. At least Ann snores
denotes the set of possibilities as strong as or stronger than Ann snores. This contains
the possibility of Ann snoring, {w10, w11}, and the possibility that both Ann and
Bill snore, {w11}. The denotation of plain, unadorned Ann snores contains just
one possibility, that of Ann snoring. The relationship between At least Ann snores
and Ann snores is analogous to the relationship between inquisitive and classical
disjunction: same underlying set of worlds, but more structure in the former.
As modified numerals will figure prominently in the experiments to be reported
on later, let us illustrate how they work.
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11 10
01 00
(a) Ann snores
11 10
01 00
(b) At least Ann snores
Figure 2 Interactive and non-interactive propositions.
(10) QUD: How many beers did Ann drink?
a. Ann drank three beers.
b. Ann drank three or four beers.
c. Ann drank at least three beers.
d. Ann drank at most three beers.
Let us assume that numerals like three have a ‘one-sided’ semantics, so three is
semantically equivalent to three or more. Further, assume that there is exactly
one world wn for every number of beers n that Ann may have consumed. Let
pn = {wn,wn+1, . . .}. For the strength ranking we assume pm >s pn iff m > n. Then
the sentences in (10) will receive the following interpretations:
(11) a. JAnn drank 3 beersKs = {p3}= {{w3,w4, . . .}}
b. JAnn drank 3 or 4 beersKs = {p3, p4}= {{w3,w4, . . .},{w4,w5, . . .}}
c. JAnn drank at least 3 beersKs = {p | p≥s p3}
= {{w3,w4, . . .},{w4,w5, . . .},{w5,w6, . . .}, . . .}
d. JAnn drank at most 3 beersKs = {p ∩ {w0, . . . ,w3} | p≤s p3}
= {{w0, . . . ,w3},{w1,w2,w3},{w2,w3},{w3}}
Just as disjunctions denote one possibility per disjunct, both at least and at most
denote one possibility for each alternative under consideration. Thus, the sentences
with superlative modifiers are interactive according to the definition in (7).
To account for the ignorance implicature, Coppock & Brochhagen (2013) gener-
alize Groenendijk & Roelofsen’s (2009) Maxim of Inquisitive Sincerity as follows:
(12) Maxim of Interactive Sincerity (Coppock & Brochhagen 2013)
If ϕ is interactive, then ϕ is interactive in the speaker’s information set.
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The speaker’s information set contains just those possible worlds that are epistemi-
cally accessible to the speaker, and a proposition is interactive there if it is interactive
once restricted to those worlds. This maxim requires that, if a speaker draws attention
to multiple possibilities (as is the case for sentences involving superlatives), she
must not know which of the possibilities under consideration holds: ‘Don’t raise an
issue if you already know how to settle it.’ Thus, in general, if a speaker knows an
alternative expressed by α to hold, it is infelicitous to utter at least α .
Comparatives are not interactive according to Coppock & Brochhagen (2013)
and are therefore not subject to the Maxim of Interactive Sincerity. Coppock &
Brochhagen (2013) assume that more than α denotes a singleton set whose sole
element is the union of all alternatives ranked higher than α . So Ann drank more
than two beers would have the following denotation.
(13) JAnn drank more than two beersKs = {⋃{p|p >s p2}}= {{w3,w4, . . .}}
A speaker who knew exactly how many beers Ann drank would not be in violation
of the Maxim of Interactive Sincerity for using this sentence. Hence the contrast
between the sentences in (1).
3 Experiments
The two hypotheses about the nature of the ignorance implication make different
predictions. Under the ignorance-as-entailment view, exactly N does not entail at
least N, and if it is known to the speaker that there are exactly three apples, then There
are at least three apples should be judged as false. On the ignorance-as-implicature
view, exactly N entails at least N. This latter view predicts There are at least three
apples to be judged true if there are obviously exactly three apples, as long as the
judgment is really made on the basis of truth and not pragmatic (in)felicity.
The inference judgment task of Geurts et al. (2010) was designed to get at
this contrast. Asking participants to judge if exactly N implies at least N seems
indeed like a straightforward way to determine whether exactly N entails at least
N. But, as we argued above, this methodology may fail to detect entailments when
the conclusion gives rise to an implicature that is not conveyed by the premise.
Therefore, we conducted experiments asking for truth-value judgments instead.
In these experiments, we depicted a scenario with exactly N objects, and asked
participants to judge sentences as true or false with respect to the depicted scenario.
3.1 Experiment 1
The first experiment tested whether, for example, There are at least three apples and
There are at most three apples are judged to be true in a situation with three apples.
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3.1.1 Methods
Figure 3 Experimental stimuli from Experiment 1.
Forty participants, recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, were presented
with a series of sentences paired with pictures, and asked to judge for each sentence
whether it was true or false with respect to the picture. Each picture contained three,
four, five, or six objects of a given type (three bananas, four boats, etc.). There were
32 pictures in total, with eight of each quantity between three and six. Examples are
shown in Figure 3.
These pictures were rotated via a latin square design through four critical and
four control conditions, so that no participant saw a given picture more than once, and
every picture was seen in every condition. In the control conditions, the sentences
were predicted to be judged false (e.g. There are more than three bananas in the
picture when the picture only showed three bananas). For a picture with N objects,
the critical conditions were at least N and at most N, more than N−1 and less than
N +1. The eight conditions are shown in Table 1.
Each condition was judged four times per participant, with four different pictures,
one for each quantity of objects. In total, each participant saw 32 experimental stimuli
and 32 fillers. The fillers also involved counting objects (e.g. There are exactly four
forks in the picture).
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Critical Control
There are at most N Xs in the picture. There are at most N−1 Xs in the picture.
There are fewer than N +1 Xs in the picture. There are fewer than N Xs in the picture.
There are at least N Xs in the picture. There are at least N +1 Xs in the picture.
There are more than N−1 Xs in the picture. There are more than N Xs in the picture.
N = amount of objects depicted, X = type of object depicted.
Table 1 Conditions used in Experiment 1.
3.1.2 Results and discussion
As expected, the control sentences were reliably judged to be false. More impor-
tantly, no significant difference between the critical conditions was found, as every
sentence type was almost unanimously judged to be true. The percentage of “true”
judgments for each condition is shown in Table 2 and graphed in Figure 4. As the
reader may expect given the extremely high percentages of “true” judgments in
every condition, there is no significant difference between the conditions (based on
a mixed-effects binomial logit model with dummy-coded variables for each of the
four conditions and random effects for subject and item; p > 0.5 for each pairwise
contrast, according to the t-statistic). Since there were so many observations per
condition, this study had sufficient power to detect a difference as little as three
percentage points if it were there; cf. the height of the error bars in Figure 4.
These results support the hypothesis that exactly N, represented by the objects in
the pictures, in fact entails both at least N and at most N: Whenever it is true that
there are three bananas, it is also true that there are at least three bananas and at most
three bananas. This entailment should not hold under the ignorance-as-entailment
view, but should under the ignorance-as-implicature view, so these results provide
empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the ignorance conveyed by superlatives is
an implicature and not an entailment.
This also suggests that truth value judgment tasks may be a more robust tool for
diagnosing entailment than validity judgment tasks, because they are less sensitive
to pragmatic infelicity than validity judgment tasks. Recall that the experiment
conducted by Geurts et al. (2010) tested parallel conditions using validity judgments,
and obtained strikingly different results. There, the ignorance implication affected
the judgments of around half of the participants, in contrast to the present experiment.
The results from the two experiments are shown side by side in Figure 4. (The error
bars on the right-hand side represent the 95% confidence interval of the mean.) The
task of judging sentences true or false with respect to a depicted scenario appears to
be a way of cutting through pragmatic effects, and getting to truth conditions.
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Conditions Percent “true” judgments (SD)
There are at most N Xs in the picture. 97.8%
There are fewer than N +1 Xs in the picture. 97.8%
There are at least N Xs in the picture. 100.0%
There are more than N−1 Xs in the picture. 97.8%
There are at most N−1 Xs in the picture. 3.3%
There are fewer than N Xs in the picture. 1.0%
There are at least N +1 Xs in the picture. 1.0%
There are more than N +2 Xs in the picture. 3.3%
Table 2 Percentage of participants that judged the sentences of Exp. 1 as true.
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Figure 4 Results of Exp. 1 in Geurts et al. 2010 (left) and our Exp. 1 (right).
3.2 Experiment 2
3.2.1 Methods
The second experiment used the same design and methodology as Experiment 1,
but the conditions were slightly different. In Experiment 1, the critical sentences
depicted a range bounded by the quantity in the depicted scenario, whereas the
critical sentences in Experiment 2 depicted a range bounded by one lower or higher
than the depicted amount. For example, instead of testing for There are at least three
bananas with a picture showing three bananas, we tested for There are at least two
bananas. Table 3 shows the eight conditions used in this experiment.
As in the first experiment, each condition was judged four times per partici-
pant, and each participant saw 32 experimental stimuli and 32 fillers. Forty new
participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
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Critical Control
There are at most N +1 Xs in the picture. There are at most N−2 Xs in the picture.
There are fewer than N +2 Xs in the picture. There are fewer than N−1 Xs in the picture.
There are at least N−1 Xs in the picture. There are at least N +2 Xs in the picture.
There are more than N−2 Xs in the picture. There are more than N +1 Xs in the picture.
N = amount of objects depicted, X = type of object depicted.
Table 3 Conditions used in Experiment 2.
Conditions Percent “true” judgments
There are at most N +1 Xs in the picture. 76.1%
There are fewer than N +2 Xs in the picture. 98.3%
There are at least N−1 Xs in the picture. 98.3%
There are more than N−2 Xs in the picture. 97.7%
There are at most N−2 Xs in the picture. 4.4%
There are fewer than N−1 Xs in the picture. 2.2%
There are at least N +2 Xs in the picture. 2.8%
There are more than N +1 Xs in the picture. 2.2%
Table 4 Percentage of participants that judged the sentences of Exp. 2 as true.
3.2.2 Results and discussion
The full list of results is given in Table 4. As before, the sentences in the control
conditions were judged to be false, meeting our pre-experimental expectations.
Three out of the four modifiers behaved just as in Experiment 1, being consistently
judged to be true under the new critical conditions. Yet the results obtained for at
most N +1 were different. In spite of the fact that the sentences in this condition
were expected to be compatible with the pictures shown, a substantial number of
participants (24%) judged them to be false. This is a statistically significant result.
Using a mixed-effects binomial logit model with dummy-coded variables for each
of the four critical conditions and random effects for subject and item, we found a
significant contrast (p < 0.0001, based on the t-statistic) between the at most N +1
condition and the others, and no significant contrasts between the other conditions
(p > 0.4 for each pairwise comparison).
This is a puzzling result, given what we have said so far. According to the truth
conditions spelled out for at most in §2, a sentence with at most N +1 is true, though
infelicitous, when there are N objects. We would therefore expect participants to
judge such a sentence as true in such a situation. As we will discuss in more detail
below, we cannot explain the fact that these sentences elicit falsity judgments on
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Conditions Percent “true” judgments
There are at most N Xs in the picture. 97.8%
There are fewer than N +1 Xs in the picture. 98.9%
There are at most N +1 Xs in the picture. 44.3%
There are fewer than N +2 Xs in the picture. 97.8%
Table 5 Percentage of participants that judged the sentences of Exp. 3 as true.
the basis of their false ignorance implicature, because there are other sentences,
involving at least, which also have a false ignorance implicature, which do not elicit
judgments of falsity. In fact, as discussed in more detail below, neither existing
approach to the ignorance implication predicts this rejection rate.
Before providing an explanation for this behavior, we wanted to see if this
contrast concerning the findings for at most could be obtained within the same
experiment. An explanation is given in §3.3.2.
3.3 Experiment 3
3.3.1 Methods
The third experiment zeroed in on the contrasting conditions from Experiments 1
and 2. We used fewer conditions, stimuli and participants, as the main goal was
primarily to see if the contrast between Experiments 1 and 2 could be reproduced in
one single experiment. Twenty participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk,
and there were four conditions in this experiment, drawing from the contrasting
conditions from Experiments 1 and 2: (i) at most N, (ii) at most N +1, (iii) fewer
than N +1, and (iv) fewer than N +2. Each sentence type was judged four times
per participant. There were 16 pictures, four of each quantity of objects from three
to six, which were rotated through the conditions using a latin square design. To
introduce variety and balance the number of sentences expected to be judged true
and false, we included 32 fillers.
3.3.2 Results and discussion
As shown in Table 5 and Figure 5, the results are in line with the findings of the
preceding experiments. Crucially, the judgments for the truth of sentences involving
at most N + 1 were significantly different from those for at most N (44.3% vs.
97.8%, p < 0.0001, using the same statistical techniques as above). This was the
only significant contrast (p > 0.7 for all other pairwise contrasts). From this we can
conclude that there is something special about this condition.
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Figure 5 Results of Experiment 3 (graph).
Figure 6 Example picture (four butterflies).
Let us consider whether one of the aforementioned approaches predicts the
behavior we found across the first two experiments and replicated in the third. For
the sake of discussion, let us focus on the following examples, in the context of the
picture in Figure 6, where there are, as the reader can see, four butterflies:
(14) a. There are at most four butterflies in the picture. [97% true]
b. There are at most five butterflies in the picture. [44% true]
According to Geurts & Nouwen’s (2007) theory, (14a) is true in case the speaker
considers it possible that there are four butterflies and considers it impossible that
there are more than four butterflies. Likewise for (14b), replacing ‘four’ with ‘five’.
If the speaker knows that there are exactly four butterflies (as in the picture), then
(14b) should be false, because the speaker doesn’t consider it possible that there
are five butterflies. (14a) should be true, though, because the speaker certainly
considers it possible that there are four butterflies if she knows that there are that
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many. So far, so good: The theory delivers a contrast where a contrast was found.
The problem, however, is that the same reasoning should also apply to at least.
In Experiment 1, speakers almost unanimously considered There are at least four
butterflies in the picture to be true when there were four butterflies in the picture,
but according to Geurts & Nouwen’s (2007) theory, this sentence should be false for
exactly the same reason: The speaker believes it possible that there are more than
four butterflies. Why don’t speakers judge the at least four sentence to be false, by
parity of reasoning, then?
Now we may ask if the inquisitive approach is better equipped to explain this
contrast. According to Coppock & Brochhagen (2013), superlative modifiers draw
attention to a set of possibilities. In particular, There are at most five butterflies
draws attention to the possibility that there are five butterflies, which is false in the
situation where there are four butterflies. There are at most four butterflies does
not draw attention to this false possibility. This might sound promising, but for
reasons entirely analogous to those given in the previous paragraph, it does not
suffice to explain what is going on. There are at least four butterflies also draws
attention to the false possibility that there are five butterflies, and yet this sentence is
unproblematically judged true. We thus arrive at the conclusion that neither approach
accounts for this contrast based on the proposed properties of superlative modifiers.
So, why is There are at most five butterflies so likely to judged as false when
there are four butterflies, even though at least four is straightforwardly true in such
a situation? The answer, we propose, has to do with the one alternative explicitly
mentioned on the surface. For example, There are at least four butterflies explicitly
mentions the possibility that there are four butterflies, and There are at most five
butterflies explicitly mentions the possibility that there are five butterflies.
In inquisitive semantics, there is a term for mentioning a possibility explicitly:
highlighting. In general, a possibility in JϕK is highlighted if it is overtly expressed
(Roelofsen & van Gool 2010; Pruitt & Roelofsen 2011; Farkas & Roelofsen to
appear). This notion has primarily been used to account for the contrast exhibited by
polar questions, where it is assumed that the mentioned possibility is highlighted, and
the response particles yes and no pick up the highlighted possibility. This explains
the different inference patterns in (15) and (16).
(15) Is the door open?
a. Yes. ⇒ the door is open
b. No. ⇒ the door is closed
(16) Is the door closed?
a. Yes. ⇒ the door is closed
b. No. ⇒ the door is open
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These two questions convey the same inquisitive content: a choice between the
possibility that the door is open, and the possibility that it is closed. Yet they differ
with respect to what possibilities they highlight, thus influencing the inferences that
arise from the different answers.
Now we are able to provide an answer to the question posed above: The dif-
ference between at most five and at least four is that the former highlights a false
possibility, while the latter only brings attention to one. The at most five sentence
highlights the possibility that there are five butterflies, which is plainly false in the
context of Figure 6. The at least four sentence brings attention to the possibility
that there are five butterflies, but does not highlight it; the at least four sentence
highlights only the possibility that there are four (or more) butterflies, which is true.
To highlight a possibility known to be false, we suggest, goes against Gricean
cooperativity. We propose to articulate the Gricean principle in question as follows.
(17) Maxim of Depictive Sincerity
If ϕ highlights a possibility p, then the speaker considers p possible.
Depictive Sincerity seems to be a strong pragmatic requirement, compared to In-
teractive Sincerity. Recall that the results of Experiment 1, in contrast to Geurts
et al.’s (2010) findings, show that violations of the Maxim of Interactive Sincerity
do not influence truth-value judgments, although they do play a role for inference
judgments. From this we concluded that truth-value judgments are less sensitive to
pragmatics than other kind of tasks. Yet as the results for at most N +1 obtained in
Experiments 2 and 3 show, even truth-value judgments are not safe from violations
of the Maxim of Depictive Sincerity.
Comparatives like There are fewer than six butterflies do not violate the Maxim
of Depictive Sincerity in the four-butterfly situation according to our theory. Recall
that, following the treatment laid out in §2, comparatives draw attention to a single
possibility containing all alternatives under consideration. Since that possibility is the
only one there is to begin with, that possibility is the only one that can be highlighted.
(Following previous work on highlighting in inquisitive semantics, we assume that
the highlighted possibility must be one of the elements of the denotation.) For
example, There are fewer than six butterflies contains only the possibility of there
being fewer than six butterflies, and this is the only one that can be highlighted.
Thus, violating Depictive Sincerity is only possible for comparatives if the sentence
is false. The highlighted possibilities for the comparative and superlative modifiers
tested in Experiment 3 are depicted in Figure 7.
At this point, the reader may reasonably wonder whether a sentence like There
are at least three butterflies violates the Maxim of Depictive Sincerity in the con-
text of four butterflies, as it would seem to highlight the possibility that there are
three butterflies. If a two-sided analysis (‘exactly N’) is given to numerals, this
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fewer than six 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
fewer than five 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
at most five 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
at most four 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 7 Highlighted (blue) and non-highlighted (grey) possibilities (on two-
sided reading, for aesthetic reasons), with N = 4 objects in the picture.
Only with at most five does the highlighted possibility fail to encompass
the actual world (colored black).
sentence does indeed highlight a false possibility: {w3}. But with a one-sided (‘N or
more’) analysis, the highlighted possibility is that there are three or more butterflies
({w3,w4, ...}), and this is true (since it contains the actual world, w4). We are thus
driven to the auxiliary conclusion that numerals can receive one-sided interpretations,
even if two-sided interpretations are also possible, as Kennedy (2012) argues.
4 Conclusion
We have provided experimental support for the hypothesis that the ignorance impli-
cation of superlatives is not an entailment, as on Geurts & Nouwen’s (2007) analysis,
but rather conveyed via implicature, as advocated by Büring (2008), Cohen & Krifka
(2011), and Coppock & Brochhagen (2013), among others. In Experiment 1, we
found that at least N and at most N are judged to be true in case exactly N is true
very close to 100% of the time.
Further, a comparison of these experimental results with the ones obtained by
Geurts et al. (2010) suggests that truth-value judgments are less sensitive to prag-
matic infelicity than inference judgments. More concretely, it seems that ignorance
implicatures do not affect truth-value judgments even though they do affect inference
judgment tasks. Even though the critical sentences with superlative modifiers in
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Experiment 1 had false ignorance implicatures, they were still judged to be true.1
Still, the results from Experiments 2 and 3 show that even truth-value judgment
tasks are not completely impervious to pragmatics. In a situation with N Xs, it was
judged false that there are ‘at most N +1 Xs’ at substantial rates (24% in Experiment
2, and 56% in Experiment 3). We argued that this cannot be due to the ignorance
implicature, and that it has to do with the fact that the alternative that is explicitly
mentioned is false. We posited a Gricean maxim (the Maxim of Depictive Sincerity)
which rules against mentioning a possibility known to be false, and concluded that
violations of this maxim — unlike violations of the Maxim of Interactive Sincerity
— can cause true sentences to be judged as false. This opens up the general question
of which Gricean maxims are so strong that they affect truth value judgments, and
which are not, and why.
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